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IMPROVING THE ODDS: CHANGING THE
PERCEPTION OF PROBLEM GAMBLING AND
SUPPORTING THE GROWTH OF
PROBLEM GAMBLING COURTS
Amaia Guenaga*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the beginning I gambled because it was fun.  It was magical the way gam-
bling freed me from the worries, fears and frustrations of everyday living.  When I
was tense, gambling relaxed me.  When I was angry, gambling calmed me down.
When I was happy, I celebrated feeling good by gambling.  Slowly, over time, gam-
bling became the only coping mechanism I knew. . . . I continued to gamble to ease
my pain - the pain of lost money, lost time, lost self-respect, and the pain of losing
control.  With every futile attempt to stop came more pain, anger, frustration and
depression.1
In the above personal account, alcohol, drugs or any other addictive sub-
stance can replace gambling.  Regardless of the replacement, the story remains
the same—in the beginning the drug or gambling feels good, but soon the use
becomes problematic, and yet it is the only way the individual knows how to
cope, and so the destructive cycle continues.
For some individuals, the need for a drug or to gamble leads them to steal
to get money to score the next hit or make the “big win.”  This may include
breaking the law in ways they may never have done or thought of doing other-
wise.  Some of these individuals may never get caught; however, others end up
in the criminal justice system, where, although the differences between sub-
stance dependence and a gambling problem may be slight, they are treated
vastly different.  Drug courts, which offer individuals who have committed
crimes because of their substance abuse the option of treatment rather than
prison time, are popular, yet parallel problem gambling courts are not.  Why
does this difference exist?  The criminal justice system’s treatment of individu-
als with problem gambling reflects society’s view of problem gambling.
Whereas offenders with drug addictions are viewed as individuals needing
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www.nevadacouncil.org/hidden_addition.php?bi=1179269148 (last visited Aug. 16, 2010).
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treatment, society still often views problem gamblers as having a character flaw
that must be punished when a crime is committed.  Thus, the conversation
regarding the similarities between problem gambling, substance abuse and
mental health problems and their treatment continues.
According to the “Comprehensive Problem Gambling Act of 2009” (here-
inafter “CPGA”), introduced by the National Council on Problem Gambling
(NCPG), problem and pathological gambling should be included among the
programs of the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
(SAMHSA).2  Additionally, this bill aims “to establish a national program to
address the harmful consequences of problem gambling.”3  According to Con-
gress’ findings, problem gambling is a “public health disorder,” for which over
six million adults met the criteria in 2008.4  Further, in 2008, problem gambling
led to $6.7 billion in social costs to families and communities due to bank-
ruptcy, divorce, job loss, and criminal justice costs.5  In addition to the high
social costs associated with problem gambling, problem gambling is also asso-
ciated with higher incidences of suicide and domestic abuse.  However, there is
currently no federal agency or organization to oversee problem gambling.6
If passed, CPGA would allow problem gambling to share standing with
substance abuse and mental illness.  It would lead to an increase in research on
problem gambling by a variety of agencies, including the National Institutes of
Health, the National Science Foundation, the National Institute of Justice, the
Bureau of Justice Statistics, and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Ser-
vices Administration.  With increased research, a national media campaign and
an oversight agency, public awareness and understanding of problem gambling
would also likely increase.  This would influence the public’s view of problem
gambling as an illness or addiction, rather than a moral weakness.  Further, not
only would SAMHSA develop a treatment protocol specific for problem gam-
bling, as it has for substance abuse and mental illness, but more grants would
also become available for comprehensive treatment and prevention services.7
This Note will examine what problem gambling is and demonstrate the
parallels between problem gambling and substance abuse.  The Note will then
explore the development and expansion of problem-solving courts for sub-
stance abuse and mental health and explore the pros and cons of problem gam-
bling courts, in the end offering support for the further creation and
development of problem gambling courts.
II. WHAT IS PROBLEM GAMBLING?
Problem gambling, compulsive gambling, pathological gambling—all are
terms one may find when reading about individuals with gambling problems.
Although the general public uses the term “compulsive gambler,” treatment
2 H.R. 2906, 111th Cong., § 3 (2009).
3 As of June 16, 2009 the bill had been referred to the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce as part of the initial legislative process H.R. 2906, 111th Cong. (2009).
4 Id. § 2.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. § 6.
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professionals use the term “pathological gambler.”8  The term “problem gam-
bler” can encompass both pathological gamblers and those who have a problem
with gambling but whose behavior may not fulfill all of the criteria necessary
for a pathological gambling diagnosis.  Additionally, the term “problem gam-
bler” may more narrowly refer to only those individuals who have a problem
with gambling but whose behavior does not rise to the level of pathological
gambling.9
According to the American Psychiatric Association (APA), to receive the
diagnosis of pathological gambling, an individual must have “persistent and
recurrent maladaptive gambling behavior” as demonstrated by five or more of
the following:
(1) is preoccupied with gambling (e.g., preoccupied with reliving past gambling
experiences, handicapping or planning the next venture, or thinking of ways to get
money with which to gamble)
(2) needs to gamble with increasing amounts of money in order to achieve the
desired excitement
(3) has repeated unsuccessful efforts to control, cut back, or stop gambling
(4) is restless or irritable when attempting to cut down or stop gambling
(5) gambles as a way of escaping from problems or of relieving a dysphoric mood
(e.g., feelings of helplessness, guilt, anxiety, depression)
(6) after losing money gambling, often returns another day to get even (“chasing”
one’s losses)
(7) lies to family members, therapist, or others to conceal the extent of involvement
with gambling
(8) has committed illegal acts such as forgery, fraud, theft, or embezzlement to
finance gambling
(9) has jeopardized or lost a significant relationship, job, or educational or career
opportunity because of gambling
(10) relies on others to provide money to relieve a desperate financial situation
caused by gambling10
Further, the gambling behavior must not be better accounted for by a
Manic Episode.11  It is estimated that between 1.6% and 4.0% of the United
8 Henry R. Lesieur, Costs and Treatment of Pathological Gambling, 556 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 153, 154 (1998).
9 Id.  There are four main stages to the development of pathological gambling: progression,
intolerance, preoccupation, and disregard for consequences.  The first stage is progression
and is where the gambler is unable to stop gambling.  Further, the gambler must spend more
time and money gambling in an effort to achieve the same excitement.  In the second phase,
intolerance, the gambler starts to hide the amount and frequency of the loss and experiences
nearly uncontrollable urges to gamble in order to win back the lost money.  Next, the preoc-
cupation phase is characterized by continuous obsessive thoughts of gambling and the belief
that all problems will be solved by gambling.  In the final stage, disregard for consequences,
still convinced that the “big win” will solve all problems, the gambler disregards the nega-
tive consequences of gambling and commonly may engage in illegal activities such as for-
gery, theft, and embezzlement.  Darren Gowen & Jerri B. Speyerer, Compulsive Gambling
and the Criminal Offender: A Treatment and Supervision Approach, 59 FED. PROBATION,
Sept. 1995, at 36, 36-37.
10 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISOR-
DERS: DSM-IV-TR 674 (4th ed. 2000).
11 Id.  A Manic Episode describes a period of time in which an individual has an “abnor-
mally and persistently elevated, expansive, or irritable mood.” Id. at 357.
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States population are pathological gamblers.12  Outside the U.S., the rate varies
from 0.8% to 6.0%.13  Furthermore, up to 3% of the U.S. population has “seri-
ous gambling problems that will result in significant personal debt, family dis-
ruption, job losses, criminal activity, and suicide.”14  Financially, mortgage,
rent, electricity and other bills may be late because of the problem gambling,
and in some cases individuals lose their homes, cars and other personal belong-
ings.15  Thus, problem gambling not only affects the gambler, but it can have
devastating effects on the family as well.  Spouses of pathological gamblers
experience a wide-range of stress-related problems including chronic or severe
headaches, insomnia, intestinal disorders and depression.16  Additionally, the
suicide attempt rates for spouses of pathological gamblers are also three times
higher than for the general population.17  Children of pathological gamblers are
also more likely than other children to exhibit delinquent behaviors, including
drinking and using drugs.18
For the pathological gambler, the stresses of financial pressure, family and
work can lead to anxiety, depression and cognitive distortions, all of which
impair judgment and decision-making.19  Having spent all of their personal or
family’s savings, pathological gamblers may turn to illegal activities such as
forging checks, embezzling and fraud.  A 1995 Illinois’ survey reports that of
the 184 Gambler Anonymous members studied, 56% admitted to stealing, with
the average amount stolen being $60,700.20  Similarly, in a study of Gambler
Anonymous members in Wisconsin, 46% admitted to stealing, with the average
amount stolen being $5,738.21
III. THE PARALLELS BETWEEN PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING AND
SUBSTANCE ABUSE/DEPENDENCE
Pathological gambling and substance dependence are classified in differ-
ent sections of the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM).22  However, because of the
similarities in criteria of the two groups, some researchers are proposing the
inclusion of pathological gambling “within the same classification system as
substance use disorders” in the next version of the DSM—DSM V.23  The cur-
rent version, DSM-IV-TR, delineates the criteria of substance dependence as:
12 Nancy M. Petry, Should the Scope of Addictive Behaviors be Broadened to Include Path-
ological Gambling?, 101 ADDICTION (SUPPL. 1) 152, 154 (2006).
13 Id.
14 Gowen & Speyerer, supra note 9, at 36 (citations omitted).
15 Lesieur, supra note 8, at 155-56.
16 Id. at 156.
17 Id. (citations omitted).
18 NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT 4-13 (1999).
19 Lesieur, supra note 8, at 157 (citations omitted).
20 Id. (citations omitted).
21 Id. (citations omitted).
22 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 10.
23 Petry, supra note 12, at 152.
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A maladaptive pattern of substance use, leading to clinically significant impairment
or distress, as manifested by three (or more) of the following, occurring at any time
in the same 12-month period:
(1) tolerance, as defined by either of the following:
(a) a need for markedly increased amounts of the substance to achieve
intoxication or desired effect
(b) markedly diminished effect with continued use of the same amount of
the substance
(2) withdrawal, as manifested by either of the following:
(a) the characteristic withdrawal syndrome for the substance. . .
(b) the same (or closely related) substance is taken to relieve or avoid with-
drawal symptoms
(3) the substance is often taken in larger amounts or over a longer period of
than was intended
(4) there is a persistent desire or unsuccessful efforts to cut down or control
substance use
(5) a great deal of time is spent in activities necessary to obtain the substance
(e.g., visiting multiple doctors or driving long distances), use the substance (e.g.,
chain-smoking), or recover from its effects
(6) important social, occupational, or recreational activities are given up or
reduced because of substance use
(7) the substance use is continued despite knowledge of having a persistent or
recurrent physical or psychological problem that is likely to have been caused or
exacerbated by the substance (e.g., current cocaine use despite recognition of
cocaine-induced depression, or continued drinking despite recognition that an
ulcer was made worse by alcohol consumption)24
Not only are the diagnostic criteria of pathological gambling and sub-
stance dependence similar, but so, too, are their consequences.  Substance
dependence and pathological gambling can have a devastating effect on fami-
lies.  For example, substance-dependent individuals and pathological gamblers
often lie in order to hide their problems.  They often get caught up in a cycle of
using or gambling to feel better only to then feel guilty and ashamed, once
again turning to their coping mechanism—the substance or the gambling—to
numb those feelings.  Further, both pathological gambling and substance
dependence can lead to confrontations with the criminal justice system.
Due to the similarities between substance dependence and pathological
gambling, pathological gambling has been referred to as a behavioral addiction
without the drug.25  In a study of gambling urges and cocaine cravings, the
same brain responses were noted when individuals addicted to cocaine were
shown drug videotapes and when individuals “addicted” to gambling were
shown gambling videos.26  In addition, many of the psychosocial treatments
used for pathological gambling were adapted from the substance abuse treat-
ment field.  These psychological treatments include motivation and cognitive-
behavioral therapies, pharmacotherapies and 12-Step programs, like Gamblers
Anonymous.27
24 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 10, at 197.
25 Marc N. Potenza, Should Addictive Disorders Include Non-Substance-Related Condi-
tions?, 101 ADDICTION (SUPPL. 1) 142, 143 (2006).
26 Id. at 145-46.
27 Petry, supra note 12, at 156; Potenza, supra note 25, at 146.
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The relationship between substance use and pathological gambling
extends further than their similarities.  There is a high rate of comorbidity
between pathological gambling and substance use disorders.28  Studies show
that over 70% of pathological gamblers have an alcohol disorder and over 30%
have a drug use disorder.29  Furthermore, Lesieur found approximately “47-52
percent of pathological gamblers receiv[e] a substance abuse diagnosis,”
whereas “between 9 and 14 percent of substance-abusing populations have
been diagnosed as pathological gamblers.”30
Pathological gambling is also often comorbid with mental health disor-
ders.  The most commonly reported mental health disorder among pathological
gamblers is major depressive disorder.31  Between 70% and 76% of pathologi-
cal gamblers receive a major depressive disorder diagnosis on a lifetime
basis.32  In addition, studies have found high rates of hypomanic and bipolar
disorder, as well as panic and anxiety disorders among pathological gamblers.33
Finally, high rates of suicidal ideation34 and suicide attempts also occur among
pathological gamblers.35
IV. PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS
Despite the many similarities and close relationships between substance
use, mental illness and pathological gambling, most of the criminal justice sys-
tem still treats them differently, continuing to view pathological gambling as a
moral flaw requiring punishment.  Although substance dependence and mental
illness are now often viewed as issues requiring treatment rather than just pun-
ishment, there are less than a handful of such programs available for similarly
situated pathological gamblers.  However, the existence of problem gambling
courts suggests that the perception of problem gambling as a character flaw that
must be punished in prison is changing.
In an effort to address issues related to individuals who were being
recycled through the criminal justice system, problem-solving courts originated
through a combination of strategies from different disciplines, including alter-
native dispute resolution, therapeutic jurisprudence and juvenile courts.36
Therapeutic justice aims not only to “identify the underlying cause of the crimi-
nal behavior,” but also to provide the necessary treatment for the individual to
become a productive citizen.37  These aims are driven by the belief that thera-
28 Petry, supra note 12, at 155; Potenza, supra note 25, at 144.
29 Petry, supra note 12, at 155.
30 Lesieur, supra note 8, at 158 (citations omitted).
31 Id. at 157.
32 Id. (citations omitted).
33 Id. at 157-58.
34 Id. at 158.
35 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N., supra note 10, at 672.
36 Andrea M. Odegaard, Note, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The Impact of Mental Health
Courts on the Criminal Justice System, 83 N.D. L. REV. 225, 229 (2007) (citing GREG
BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS: THE CASE FOR PROBLEM-SOLVING JUSTICE 39
(2005)).
37 Ronald J. Rychlak & Corey D. Hinshaw, From the Classroom to the Courtroom: Thera-
peutic Justice and the Gaming Industry’s Impact on Law, 74 MISS. L.J. 827, 832-33 (2005)
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peutic alternatives that complement judicial values are more effective in solv-
ing an individual’s problems, and thus, in serving individuals.38  Problem-
solving courts also share a common underlying premise that courts should not
only recognize and understand the social or psychological problems underlying
a dispute, but that they should also address these problems in such a manner as
to prevent the offender from returning to jail.39  In line with this view, problem-
solving courts not only deal with issues of disputed facts, they also focus on the
underlying social or psychological issues which led to the dispute.40  As of
2007, there were more than 2,000 problem-solving courts,41 including drug
courts, domestic violence courts, unified family courts and mental health
courts.
A. Drug Courts
The nation’s first drug court was established in 1989 in Dade County,
Florida42 as a reflection of the times.  The sudden increase of cocaine use from
the 1980s to the 1990s saw the emergence of two major trends in the justice
system: the “war on drugs” and the use of intermediate sanctions.43  As docket
pressure increased from the “war on drugs,” judges, attorneys and probation
officers grew frustrated with the ineffectiveness of imprisoning alcohol and
other drug offenders only to see them return to their drug or alcohol use and
reoffend.44  Thus, support for alcohol and substance treatment options as a
component of sentencing grew quickly, resulting in the emergence of drug
courts.45
The drug court programs were an attempt to reconcile the divergent goals
and inherent tension between the criminal justice system and treatment provid-
ers.46  Whereas a treatment provider’s goal is to help a client to modify his
behavior using the least restrictive means possible, the criminal justice system
emphasizes public safety through supervision and surveillance.47  Further, the
basis for the treatment system is establishing rapport with clients, engaging and
motivating them, whereas the criminal justice system is concerned with the
potential threat the individual may pose to society.48  Despite these seemingly
irreconcilable differences, drug courts appear to have found an effective middle
ground.
(citing Teresa W. Carns et al., Therapeutic Justice in Alaska’s Courts, 19 ALASKA L. REV. 1,
5 (2002)).
38 Gregory L. Acquaviva, Comment, Mental Health Courts: No Longer Experimental, 36
SETON HALL L. REV. 971, 987 (2006) (citations omitted).
39 Odegaard, supra note 36, at 228 (citing BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 36, at 32).
40 Id. (citing BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 36, at 32).
41 Id. at 230.
42 Acquaviva, supra note 38, at 983 (citations omitted).
43 Gloria Danziger & Jeffrey A. Kuhn, Drug Treatment Courts: Evolution, Evaluation, and
Future Directions, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 166, 167 (1999) (citations omitted).
44 Michael C. Dorf & Jeffrey A. Fagan, Problem-Solving Courts: From Innovation to Insti-
tutionalization, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1501, 1501-02 (2003).
45 Id. at 1502.
46 Danziger & Kuhn, supra note 43, at 167-68.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 168.
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Although drug courts can vary in terms of their structure and target popu-
lations, they have three primary goals in common: to reduce recidivism, to
reduce substance abuse, and to rehabilitate participants.49  While in drug court,
the “participants undergo long-term treatment and counseling” as well as fre-
quent court appearances,50 where, if they have not been complying with the
program’s rules or their treatment plan, the judge can apply a variety of sanc-
tions.  Those who successfully complete the program can have their charges
dismissed or reduced, or their sentences reduced or even set aside.51  The drug
court’s goal is for participants to successfully complete the program and be able
to participate productively in society, thereby maintaining their sobriety and
avoiding illegal activities.52
Although the specifics of each drug court may vary, there are some key
components of the drug court model.  First, a non-adversarial relationship
between the defendant and the court is important,53 as the focus is rehabilita-
tion rather than punishment.  In addition, drug courts seek to identify substance
abuse problems and the need for treatment upon arrest, and to refer identified
individuals to treatment as soon as possible.54  This also entails offering access
to a continuum of treatment and rehabilitation services.55  Because the individ-
uals are in the court system and must comply with drug court rules in order to
continue to be in the program, the drug court monitors the participants’ absti-
nence through frequent, mandatory drug testing.56  Additionally, sanctions,
which impose accountability on the offender turned participant, are the corner-
stone of drug court programs.57
Moreover, drug court personnel—judge, prosecutor, defense counsel,
treatment provider and corrections personnel—are considered part of a team
which coordinates how the court will respond to participants’ compliance or
lack thereof.58  The drug court judge also takes a hands-on approach, interact-
ing with each drug court participant.59  Throughout the process the drug court
team monitors and evaluates the program’s overall goals and effectiveness,
making adjustments when necessary.60  Further, in an effort to promote local
support and increase the drug court’s effectiveness, drug court personnel main-
tain relationships with various community agencies.61
49 NAT’L CRIM. JUSTICE REFERENCE SERV., In the Spotlight: Drug Courts, http://www.ncjrs.
gov/spotlight/drug_courts/Summary.html (last updated Sept. 10, 2009).
50 Id.
51 Id.  (citing U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DRUG COURTS: OVERVIEW OF GROWTH,
CHARACTERISTICS, AND RESULTS (1997)).
52 Danziger & Kuhn, supra note 43, at 168 (citing Peggy Fulton Hora, et al., Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Jus-
tice System’s Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439,
453 (1999)).
53 Id. (citing Fulton Hora, supra note 52, at 453).
54 Id. at 173-74.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 168.
57 Id. at 174 (citations omitted).
58 Id. at 168-69 (citing Fulton Hora, supra note 52, at 453).
59 Id. at 169 (citations omitted).
60 Id. at 169.
61 Id. at 171; Odegaard, supra note 36, at 230 (citations omitted).
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In October 2003, there were 1,091 operating drug courts and 413 more in
the planning stage.62  By June 2009, this number had jumped to “2,038 drug
courts operating in all 50 States, the District of Columbia, Northern Mariana
Islands, Puerto Rico, and Guam, [with] [a]nother 226 drug court programs . . .
in the planning stages.”63  As suggested by their proliferation throughout the
United States, drug courts are generally considered effective in curbing recidi-
vism.  One estimate as to the effectiveness of drug court suggests that although
the average cost per program participant was $5,928, $2,329 was saved in crim-
inal justice costs and another $1,301 was saved in victimization costs over a
period of 30 months.64  Further, a 2003 Washington State study reports that
drug court “participants were 13 percent less likely to become repeat offenders
than defendants who went through the regular criminal system.”65  This led to a
savings of “$3,759 per participant in potential administrative costs and $3,020
in costs to victims.”66
B. Mental Health Courts
Inspired by the success of drug courts, Broward County, Florida began the
country’s first mental health court in 1997.67  Similar to drug courts, mental
health courts were a product of desperation over a criminal justice practice
which seemed to “recycle” offenders with mental illness.68  This recycling
occurred because detention facilities were unable to adequately deal with men-
tally ill offenders.69  In addition, those individuals with mental illnesses who
were sent to prison often served longer sentences than other prisoners who had
committed the same crime because treatment in prison requires more time.70
Studies show that 48% of federal prisoners with a mental illness “have three or
more prior probations, incarcerations or arrests, compared to just 28%” of pris-
oners without a mental illness.71
Like drug courts, mental health courts are problem-solving courts.  Here,
the focus is on diverting individuals with mental illness into long-term mental
health treatment, rather than jail.72  The arresting officer, the defense attorney,
the judge, or the prosecution can identify candidates for mental health court.73
Once identified, the individuals undergo psychiatric evaluations, and if they are
62 Dorf & Fagan, supra note 44, at 1503.
63 NAT’L CRIM. JUSTICE REFERENCE SERV., supra note 49 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSIS-
TANCE DRUG CT., CLEARINGHOUSE PROJECT, SUMMARY OF DRUG COURT ACTIVITY BY
STATE AND COUNTY (2009)).
64 Id. (citing NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, DRUG COURTS: THE SECOND DECADE (2006)).
65 Ken Belson, Stressing Help, Not Penalties, In Gambling Treatment Court, N.Y. TIMES,
May 1, 2007, at B4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/01/nyregion/01gamble.
html?_r=1.
66 Id.
67 Acquaviva, supra note 38, at 983 (citations omitted).
68 Id. at 974 (citing Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving
Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1055, 1060 (2003)).
69 Id. at 975 (citations omitted).
70 Odegaard, supra  note 36, at 234 (citations omitted).
71 Acquaviva, supra note 38, at 975 (citations omitted).
72 Developments in the Law – The Law of Mental Illness, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1168, 1169
(2008) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
73 Id.
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diagnosed with a mental illness that contributed to their offense, they are given
the option of long-term treatment rather than prison.74  The rehabilitative treat-
ment focus considers the mental health court participant a “client” or “court
customer” rather than a defendant, and the judge is viewed as someone who
offers help instead of imposing punishment.75  Due to the specialty-focus of the
mental health court, all personnel are trained in mental illness and treatment
and in understanding the psychology underlying criminal behavior of individu-
als with a mental illness.76
However, not everyone is eligible for mental health court.  Mental health
courts vary by jurisdiction as to “whether they will accept individuals who have
already been convicted or charged with a crime” as opposed to those who have
just been arrested.77  Those who are eligible participate in outpatient treatment,
meet regularly with court or probation officers, appear before the judge and
take part in group counseling.78  Upon successful completion of the program,
participants can have their criminal records cleared.79
Just as with drug courts, there are key components to structuring mental
health courts.  Similar to drug courts, mental health courts have specialized
teams made up of attorneys, mental health workers and the judge.80  In addi-
tion, labeling and stigmatizing the individual with a mental illness is prohibited
and there is a reduction of the adversarial approach inside the courtroom which
helps maintain a more collaborative and therapeutic environment.81  Further, in
accordance with treatment values, the least restrictive means possible are used
to get participants into supportive programs.82  This is, however, always bal-
anced with protecting the public’s safety.83  To keep the participants engaged
and motivated in the program, mental health court personnel support autono-
mous decision-making.84  Whenever possible, and with input from the mental
health team, the defendant is allowed to make decisions concerning his mental
health issues.85  In addition, as in drug court, mental health courts strive to
offer the participants intervention and treatment immediately upon arrest.86
74 Id. at 1169-70 (citations omitted).
75 Id. at 1177 (citations omitted).
76 Id. at 1170.
77 Id. at 1171 (citing Tamar M. Meekins, “Specialized Justice”: The Over-Emergence of
Specialty Courts and the Threat of a New Criminal Defense Paradigm, 40 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 1, 16-17 (2006)).
78 Id.
79 Id. (citing Stacey M. Faraci, Slip Slidin’ Away?  Will Our Nation’s Mental Health Court
Experiment Diminish the Rights of the Mentally Ill?, 22 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 811, 829-30
(2004)).
80 Odegaard, supra note 36, at 238 (citing Judge Randall B. Fritzler, 10 Key Components of
a Criminal Mental Health Court, in JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC JURIS-
PRUDENCE AND THE COURTS 118 (Bruce J. Winick & David Wexler eds., 2003)).
81 Id. (citing Fritzler, supra note 80, at 119-20).
82 Id. (citing Fritzler, supra note 80, at 119).
83 Id. (citing Fritzler, supra note 80, at 119).
84 Id. (citing Fritzler, supra note 80, at 120).
85 Id. (citing Fritzler, supra note 80, at 120).
86 Id. at 239 (citing Fritzler, supra note 80, at 120).
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As of 2007, there were approximately 150 mental health courts across the
United States.87  The increase in the number of mental health courts is due not
only to government funding of mental health courts, but also to their effective-
ness, particularly in reducing recidivism.88  In response to the New Freedom
Commission on Mental Health’s findings, Congress passed bills in 2004 to cre-
ate and fund mental health court programs.89  In terms of their effectiveness,
compared to individuals with a mental illness with similar backgrounds in jail
or prison, participants in mental health courts “often have much lower rates of
reoffense while on probation.”90  Studies “show dramatic drops in recidivism
for those who complete [mental health court] programs.”91  In a study con-
ducted in King County, Washington over a twelve-month period, individuals
who had graduated from mental health court were over 75% less likely to reof-
fend.92  Further, those who did reoffend were about 88% less likely to commit
a violent offense.93  In addition, in a study of Clark County, Nevada, the thirty-
three individuals studied had amassed 3,529 days in jail and had been arrested
129 times before the formation of the mental health court.94  After the creation
of the mental health court, these numbers dropped to 777 days in jail and only
forty-nine arrests.95  Drops in recidivism from 78% to 16% have also been
reported for mental health court.96
Inspired by the successes of drug courts and the frustration of a criminal
justice policy which appeared to be a revolving door for offenders with a
mental illness, the number of mental health courts has been growing and
appears to be successful in providing treatment to offenders with a mental ill-
ness and thus decreasing the frequency of reoffense.
C. Problem Gambling Courts
Encouraged by the successes of drug and mental health courts and per-
ceiving a similar need for alternative treatment of pathological gamblers in the
criminal justice system, three states–New York, Louisiana, and Nevada—have
developed problem gambling courts or similar diversionary programs.  In 2001,
Senior Justice Mark Farrell of Amherst, New York created the first problem
gambling court.97  The creation of the problem gambling court reflected an
87 Id. at 237 (citations omitted).
88 Acquaviva, supra note 38, at 990 (citations omitted).
89 Developments in the Law, supra note 72, at 1173-74 (citations omitted).
90 Id. at 1172.
91 Id. at 1179.
92 Id. at 1173.
93 Id. (citing JOHN R. NEISWENDER, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF EVALUATION OF OUTCOMES
FOR KING COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH COURT 4 (2004), available at http://www.metrokc.gov/
KCDC/mhcsum32.pdf).
94 Acquaviva, supra note 38, at 992 (citing Sean Whaley, Clark County: Praises Sung for
Mental Health Court, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Feb. 19, 2005, at 4B).
95 Id.
96 Developments in the Law, supra note 72, at 1173 (citing KELLY O’KEEFE, CTR. FOR CT.
INNOVATION, THE BROOKLYN MENTAL HEALTH COURT EVALUATION 53 (2006), available at
http://www.courtinnovation.org/uploads/documents/BMHCevaluation.pdf).
97 Corey D. Hinshaw, Taking a Gamble: Applying Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Compul-
sive Gambling and Establishing Gambling Treatment Courts, 9 GAMING L. REV. 333, 334
(2005) (citing Kate Gurnett, Therapeutic Justice Still a Long Shot, ALBANY TIMES UNION,
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understanding of problem gambling and a recognition that problem gamblers
who engaged in illegal activity in order to fund their gambling needed treat-
ment for their underlying disorder, not just punishment in the form of jail
time.98  New York’s problem gambling court program handles misdemeanors
of $1,000 or less, or felonies in which charges have been reduced through plea
bargains.99  In order to participate in the problem gambling court, participants
must comply with all of the program rules,100 including pleading guilty and
waiving all rights to plea-bargain upon acceptance into the program.101  If par-
ticipants are successful in completing the program, all of their charges will be
dropped.102  If they are not compliant, they can be returned to criminal court
where they will be charged with a felony.103
Since the inception of the problem gambling court in Amherst, two new
casinos have opened nearby, leading to a gradually growing caseload.104  The
docket in this court ranges from middle-aged college-educated parents to drug-
using youth with criminal records.105  Justice Farrell’s gambling court meets
once every other week for an hour, right before drug court.106  The gambling
court shares its funding with drug court and domestic violence court, receiving
about $50,000 a year in grants and donations.107  The funds pay for urine tests,
educational materials, computers, travel expenses and overtime for police
officers who search for defendants with outstanding warrants.108
Although the Amherst gambling court is still too small and young to statis-
tically demonstrate its effectiveness, the court staff reported that, as of May
2007, over one-half of the more than 100 participants had successfully com-
pleted the program, and of those, only one had been rearrested.109  They also
noted that the individual rearrested was arrested for an offense not associated
with gambling.110  Just as drug courts and mental health courts showed promise
when they began, problem gambling courts are also showing their potential.
Following New York’s example, Louisiana’s Department of Health and
Hospitals, in 2005, announced a statewide expansion of its Gambling Treat-
ment Referral Program.111  The purpose of Louisiana’s program is to divert
first- or second-time offenders who have committed nonviolent crimes, includ-
Jan. 13, 2003, available at http://www.responsiblegambling.org/articles/Therapeutic_justice
_still_a_long_shot.pdf).
98 Id. (citing I. Nelson Rose, The World’s Only Gambling Court, http://www.gamblingand
thelaw.com/columns/153_gambling_court.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2004)).
99 Belson, supra note 65.
100 Rychlak & Hinshaw, supra note 37, at 840 (citations omitted).
101 Id. (citations omitted).
102 Id.
103 Id. (citations omitted).
104 Belson, supra note 65, at A1.
105 Id. at A1.
106 Id. at B4.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 The Gambling Treatment Referral Program is a pilot project started in the 26th Judicial
District Court in November 2004.  News Release, Bob Johannessen, La. Dep’t Health and
Hospitals, Program Emphasizes Treatment, Not Incarceration, for Louisiana’s Problem
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ing theft and forgery, associated with their problem gambling, into treatment
rather than prison.112  In expanding this program, Louisiana had a number of
goals in mind.  The program not only endeavored to match an offender with an
appropriate sentence to decrease the chances of a repeat offense, but it also
sought to help decrease the crowded dockets and reduce the number of people
imprisoned.113  In addition, the state projected that the program would be more
cost-effective, because on average, treatment costs are one-tenth of the costs of
supporting an imprisoned person.114  Finally, Louisiana sought to reduce the
impact of crime related to pathological gambling on the victims, such as fami-
lies, employers and colleagues.115
As with all diversionary programs, not everyone is eligible for Louisiana’s
Gambling Treatment and Referral Program.  Specifically, individuals who have
caused death or serious bodily injury, have prior convictions for a violent crime
or who have used force are not eligible for this program.116  For individuals
who are eligible, admission to the voluntary program includes a referral by the
District Attorney followed by assessment and acceptance to the program by the
Louisiana Association on Compulsive Gambling.117  The offender must then
agree to all of the terms and conditions of the program.118  If he does not suc-
cessfully complete all of the conditions of the program, he will return to the
judicial system for further proceedings.119  Louisiana’s treatment program
receives funds through the Department of Health and Hospitals—Office for
Addictive Disorders, Compulsive and Problem Gambling Fund, which receives
revenue from the gambling industry as required by state law.120
Understanding and support of problem gambling appear to be growing
geographically.  In 2009, Nevada’s legislature passed Assembly Bill 102,
which authorizes a court to establish a voluntary treatment program for prob-
lem gamblers as an alternative to imprisonment.121  In order to take part in the
program, the individual must first agree to pay the costs of his assigned pro-
gram.122  If he is unable to pay, the court can assign that person to a treatment
program which receives federal or state funding in order to offset the costs.123
As with the New York and Louisiana programs, there are exclusionary criteria.
In Nevada, an individual is not eligible for the program if the person has com-
mitted a crime against a person punishable as a felony or gross misdemeanor, a
crime against a child, a sexual offense, or an act which constitutes domestic
Gamblers (Jan. 7, 2005), http://www.dhh.state.la.us/news.asp?ID=1&Detail=422&Arch=
2005 [hereinafter Johannessen].
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 20TH JUD. DIST. ATT’Y’S OFFICE, Pre-Trial Diversion, http://www.felicianasda.org/
diversion.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2010).
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Johannessen, supra note 111.
120 Id.
121 Assemb. B. 102, 2009 Leg., 75th Sess., 2009 Nev. Stats. 1434 (Nev. 2009).
122 Id. § 6(3).
123 Id.
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violence.124  In addition, if the individual has other pending criminal proceed-
ings for a felony or if he is on probation or parole and the appropriate authority
does not consent to his enrollment in the program, he may not participate.125
In Nevada, before a defendant is enrolled in the program, the court holds a
hearing, during which the District Attorney may present evidence for or against
the suitability of the program for the defendant.126  If the court determines that
the defendant is eligible, the defendant is then evaluated for problem gambling
and to determine whether treatment would likely help.127  The court explains to
the eligible defendant all the conditions of the program, to which he must agree
in order to participate.128  This includes advising the defendant that if he
accepts treatment, a certified counselor could supervise him for a period of one
to three years.129  A counselor evaluates the individual and determines whether
the treatment will be inpatient, confined in an institution or on an outpatient
basis.130  While in the Nevada problem gambling court program, defendants
participate in counseling and support sessions.131  Defendants also participate
in educational sessions, in which they learn about the social, psychological,
medical and financial impact of gambling.132  Further, if additional services are
needed, for example, substance abuse treatment or help with housing, appropri-
ate referrals are made to other agencies.133
The emergence of these problem gambling courts/diversionary programs
demonstrates the parallels between drug courts, mental health courts and prob-
lem gambling courts.  All of these programs share the common goal of target-
ing the underlying disorder, whether that is substance abuse, mental illness or
pathological gambling, in order to ensure that the individuals do not reoffend.
They demonstrate an understanding of the effects that substance abuse, mental
illness and problem gambling can have, not just on the individuals but also the
devastating effects they can have on those around the offender.  These diver-
sionary programs also demonstrate an acknowledgment that imprisoning some-
one who committed a nonviolent offense related to his substance use, mental
illness or pathological gambling does not solve the problem but only opens the
way for the revolving door.
Although there are many similarities between drug courts, mental health
courts, and problem gambling courts, problem gambling also has some unique
features which must be addressed in a diversionary program.  For example,
whereas in drug court, urine samples can detect whether an individual has been
using in violation of the program’s conditions, urine samples cannot be used to
detect whether or not someone has been gambling.134  Instead, alternative
approaches need to be used in order to monitor the problem gambler’s compli-
124 Id. § 7(1).
125 Id. § 7(3)-(4).
126 Id. § 8(1)(b).
127 Id. § 9(1).
128 Id. § 8(2).
129 Id. § 8(2)(b)(1).
130 Id. § 9(1).
131 Id. § 6(2)(a).
132 Id. § 6(2)(a)-(b).
133 Id. § 6(2)(c).
134 Gowen & Speyerer, supra note 9, at 36.
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ance.  This can include surveillance of the offender’s activities, intensive super-
vision, home confinement or electronic monitoring equipment.135  In addition,
the offender’s finances may be monitored.136
The defendant may also sign self-exclusion forms to keep him from casi-
nos.  While the self-excluding individual is the only one who can execute this
option, it could be a component of the treatment requirement.137  The concept
behind the self-exclusion policy is that the gambler recognizes that he has a
problem and takes this active step.138  With self-exclusion, the gambler agrees
not to enter the casino and faces a range of sanctions, including being placed on
the state’s involuntary “Excluded Person List,” forfeiture of winnings if the
gambler does enter the casino and wins, or being charged with criminal tres-
pass.139  There are, however, some practical difficulties with the enforcement
of self-exclusion lists.  It may be unrealistic and unfair to depend upon casinos
and casino security to monitor for a specific gambler, especially given casinos’
open door policy.140  Further, there is a potential for abuse of these programs if
a problem gambler enters a casino despite the self-exclusion policy, gambles,
loses and then sues the casino for not keeping him out.141
The emergence of problem-solving courts targeting problem gambling is
evidence of the shift in perception of problem gambling from a character flaw
which must be punished to an illness or addiction which should be treated.  It is
also recognition of the devastating effects that problem gambling can have on
an individual, his family and society as a whole.  Moreover, the emergence of
problem gambling courts demonstrates a recognition that sending someone to
prison because he forged checks in order to cover his bets does not target the
underlying problem—the gambling—and thus does not offer the individual the
opportunity for rehabilitation, which would allow that individual to reenter
society productively and, having received treatment for his gambling problem,
avoid future criminal behavior.
D. Criticisms and Concerns of Problem-Solving Courts
Not everyone supports the notion of problem-solving courts.  Some judges
think of them as an administrative burden, whereas some defense attorneys are
often hesitant to allow their clients to admit to an addiction in addition to a
particular crime.142  Opponents of problem-solving courts have also expressed
concerns about due process and individual autonomy of the defendants,143 with
135 Id. at 38.
136 Id.
137 William N. Thompson, Robert W. Stocker, II, & Peter J. Kulick, Remedying the Lose-
Lose Game of Compulsive Gambling: Voluntary Exclusions, Mandatory Exclusions, or an
Alternative Method?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1221, 1246 (2007).
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 1255.
141 Joseph M. Kelly & Alex Igelman, Compulsive Gambling Litigation: Casinos and the
Duty of Care, 13 GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 386, 387 (2009); See Thompson, Stocker, II, &
Kulick, supra note 137, at 1255 (for discussion on an alternative to the self-exclusion
method, “Tell them they are not welcome”).
142 Belson, supra note 65, at B4.
143 Developments in the Law, supra note 72, at 1177 (citations omitted).
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some critics arguing that this therapeutic model of criminal justice is at odds
with the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Fourteenth and perhaps the Eighth
amendments.144
1. Constitutional Concerns
As problem-solving courts focus on treatment rather than punishment,
guilt is replaced as a relevant issue by the question of, “who is entitled to treat-
ment and whether treatment is ‘successful.’”145  Further, in this collaborative
court, the judge becomes part of the treatment team, which also consists of the
prosecutor, defense attorney, probation officer, treatment provider and defen-
dant.  As part of the treatment team, the judge’s discretionary authority
expands, as “treatment decisions require the judge to rely on extralegal authori-
ties, such as medical or social science.”146  Thus, in this capacity, the judge in a
problem-solving court is basing decisions on the clinical treatment plan rather
than on law or fact.147  In addition, all of the treatment team members share
decision-making responsibilities, with clinical experts and treatment providers
having a significant influence in determining whether the treatment program is
working or whether the participant is complying.148  Critics are concerned with
this dilution of power because it can result in a range of sanctions to the partici-
pant, including his loss of liberty, if the defendant is found to be non-compliant.
a. Coercion
Critics of problem-solving courts also express concerns over the coercive
power of choosing between a criminal trial and participation in treatment.  How
many would choose the threat of a long jail sentence over entering treatment?
However, whereas avoiding prison time may be a strong incentive for defend-
ants to choose to participate in problem-solving court programs, it is ultimately
up to the individual whether or not to agree to the program and its terms when a
defendant makes a plea bargain.  However, critics argue that even if treatment
entry is comparable to a plea bargain, the exit from treatment is not.149
Whereas the standard applied to a defendant as to whether he has successfully
completed the program in a plea bargain is an objective one, the standard in a
problem-solving court is a subjective one.150  The judge and the treatment team
determine whether the defendant has adequately complied with and completed
treatment.151
b. Waiver of Rights
Critics also express concern that defendants must waive certain constitu-
tional rights, which they would otherwise have in a traditional court setting, in
144 Timothy Casey, When Good Intentions Are Not Enough: Problem-Solving Courts and
the Impending Crisis of Legitimacy, 57 SMU L. REV. 1459, 1497 (2004).
145 Id. at 1462.
146 Id. (citations omitted).
147 Id. at 1459.
148 Id. at 1462-63.
149 Id. at 1499.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 1462-63.
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order to participate in problem-solving courts.  Although federal and state con-
stitutions provide a criminal defendant protection against coerced self-incrimi-
nation and unreasonable searches and seizures, critics argue that the
collaborative framework of problem-solving courts cannot function without full
disclosures by the defendant, disclosure that is “unimpeded by the interference
of counsel.”152  Moreover, participants in problem-solving courts waive their
rights to unreasonable searches and seizures, having to consent to any searches
or, for example, random drug tests, in order to be able to participate in the
program.153  Further, critics express concern that “in some jurisdictions the
defendant must waive the right to move to recuse the treatment court judge.”154
Waiving these rights may not be an issue for the defendant if he is pro-
gressing well in treatment and successfully completes the program.  However,
in those instances when the treatment team believes that the defendant is not
putting forth sufficient effort and wants to discontinue the treatment and the
defendant disagrees with this evaluation, the collaborative nature of problem-
solving courts no longer applies.155  Instead, there is a return to the more adver-
sarial traditional court.156  At this time, due process rights and protection
should be applied; unfortunately by then, the defendant has already waived
these rights.157  Further, this moment of “failure” is also when the judge has the
most discretion and power, and the decision on whether or not the defendant
satisfactorily completed the treatment program is based on a clinical or subjec-
tive standard rather than on a legal one.158  Additionally, the judge making this
determination is the same one who has been involved with the defendant
throughout the treatment process.  Although this may give the judge the advan-
tage of knowing the defendant and his case better, it may also work to the
detriment of the defendant, who has had to waive the right to move to recuse
the judge, if the judge has a bias against him.
c. Changing Role of Defense Attorneys
The collaborative nature of problem-solving courts has led to some con-
cern about the new role of defense attorneys.  Traditionally, defense attorneys
are supposed to be zealous advocates for their clients, focusing on the best
interest of their clients.  However, some critics of problem-solving courts point
to an inherent tension between a defense attorney’s traditional duty of zealous
representation and the problem-solving court’s expectation that the defense
attorney collaborate with the other treatment team members.159  “The primary
role of defense counsel in the problem-solving courts is to facilitate the treat-
152 Id. at 1482.
153 Id. at 1483.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Symposia, Problem Solving Courts: From Adversarial Litigation to Innovative Jurispru-
dence, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1755, 1920 (2002) [hereinafter Problem Solving Courts].
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ment process, and ethical questions arise when the wishes of the client differ
from what the treatment team perceives to be the best interests of the client.”160
Defense attorneys also have to navigate potential ethical dilemmas con-
cerning their duty of loyalty.  As part of the treatment team in problem-solving
courts, defense attorneys, along with the judge, prosecutor and counselors,
attend case conferences during which they discuss the progress of the defen-
dant, who is sometimes not present.  During those times when the defendant is
not at the meeting, should the defense attorney tell him if his counselor thinks
he is being manipulative or if the group determines that the defendant is being
non-compliant and is considering sanctioning him?161  If the defense attorney
tells the defendant that the counselor thinks he is being manipulative, this will
likely threaten the therapeutic relationship, yet if the counselor does not tell the
defendant, then is he not violating his duty of loyalty to the client?162
In addition, for treatment to be the most effective, the defendant should
enter the program as soon as possible.  This can make it difficult for defense
attorneys to advocate for their clients.  Problem-solving courts strive to identify
eligible participants in need of treatment upon arrest and refer them to treat-
ment as soon as possible.  Although this quick turnaround may be beneficial for
treatment and to free dockets, it can also increase the pressure on defense attor-
neys.163  Many problem-solving courts require the defendant to plead guilty in
order to enter into the program.  Defense attorneys have an ethical duty to
advise their clients about any plea offers and to counsel them on whether
acceptance of the offer is in their best interest.164  However, the quick turn-
around limits the defense attorney’s ability to investigate, file motions, or
engage in significant discovery before the offer must be accepted or refused.165
This makes it more difficult for the defense attorney to determine the strength
of the prosecutor’s case against the defendant and, thus, to advise the defendant
accordingly.  Further, many times the defendant is incarcerated and unable to
afford bail, adding pressure to plead guilty and accept treatment, regardless of
the defendant’s innocence or the strength of his case.166  In addition, according
to critics, pleading guilty and entering treatment may not be the best deal for
the defendant, considering that the majority of the defendants in similar cases
would be given probation in the end regardless of whether they plead early,
waited to plead, or went to trial.167  Although in accepting the diversionary
program, the defendant may get his freedom in the short term, he may later
suffer from the resulting long-term consequences of a guilty plea, including the
risk of losing public housing, eligibility for federal student loans or entry into
the military, among others.168
160 Casey, supra note 144, at 1483 (citation omitted).
161 Problem Solving Courts, supra note 159, at 1920.
162 Id.
163 Cait Clarke & James Neuhard, “From Day One”: Who’s in Control as Problem Solving
and Client-Centered Sentencing Take Center Stage?, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 11,
30 (2004).
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 30-31 (citations omitted).
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2. Net Widening
Some critics further wonder whether problem-solving courts lead to a pro-
cess called “net widening.”  Net widening is a phenomenon whereby the very
existence of the problem-solving court leads to an increase in the number of
people brought into the criminal justice system and an increase in prosecutions
in cases which would otherwise have been dismissed or not prosecuted as a
felony.169  Minority clients may be particularly vulnerable to net widening not
only because drug sweeps often occur in minority and low-income neighbor-
hoods, but also because minority defendants may accept entry into a problem-
solving court programs in cases where others might not.170  On the other hand,
for those minority clients who live in underserved communities with limited
access to resources such as drug or mental health treatment, a problem-solving
court may be their best opportunity for recovery and avoiding incarceration.171
3. Funding
Opponents of problem-solving courts also argue that the funding and
resources necessary to establish and maintain problem-solving courts outweigh
the benefits that the courts may provide.172  While studies do show the effec-
tiveness of problem-solving courts, there is disagreement concerning the mag-
nitude of the effect on recidivism.173  This is due to methodological
limitations.174  For example, studies often use arrest rates as indicators of pro-
gram success, however these arrest rates can only account for those individuals
who relapsed and were caught; they do not reflect individuals who relapsed and
committed a crime but were not caught.175  In addition, due to the variability in
structure, scope, and population served by problem-solving courts, it is not only
difficult to compare programs, but research results may not be generalizable.176
However, at least both opponents and proponents of problem-solving courts
agree that more and better research is needed.177  Longitudinal studies measur-
ing effectiveness need to be conducted.178  Further, problem-solving courts
should adopt on-going self-studies to not only measure their effectiveness but
to strive for continual improvement.179
169 Robert V. Wolf, Race, Bias, and Problem-Solving Courts, 21 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 27, 39
(2009); Clarke & Neuhard, supra note 155, at 29 (citing Morris B. Hoffman, The Drug
Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437, 1501-03 (2000)).
170 Wolf, supra note 169, at 40 (citing Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts
and the False Promise of Judicial Interventionalism, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479, 1568 (2004)
(quotation omitted)).
171 Id. at 42.
172 Hinshaw, supra note 97, at 337 (citations omitted).
173 Loreen Wolfer & James C. Roberts, A Theoretical Exploration of a Drug Court Pro-
gram Based on Client Experiences, 35 CONTEMPORARY DRUG PROBLEMS 481, 482 (2008)
(citations omitted).
174 Id. (citations omitted).
175 Id. (citations omitted).
176 Id.
177 Dorf & Fagan, supra note 44, at 1505.
178 Id. at 1505-06.
179 Id. at 1506.
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4. Not Enough Need
There are also those critics who specifically oppose problem gambling
courts.  They argue that because the rate of pathological gambling is not as high
as that of substance abuse, pathological gambling is not as big of a social prob-
lem and should not be considered the equivalent to substance abuse.180  Conse-
quently, these critics argue that funds and resources necessary to provide
problem gambling court programs for this smaller percentage of people are not
worth it.181  However, the availability of legal gambling has increased signifi-
cantly in the last thirty years, with more people gambling and increasing their
wagers.182  Legalized gambling can be found in all but two states, Hawaii and
Utah.183  In 1999, pari-mutuel racetracks and betting were legal in over forty
states, while thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia had lotteries.184
In addition, Native American casinos could be found in all regions of the coun-
try, and “non-Indian casino gambling had expanded from Nevada and Atlantic
City to the Mississippi Gulf Coast, Midwest riverboats, and western mining
towns;”185 not to mention “the proliferation of telephone and on-line gam-
bling.”186  Studies show that increased availability of gambling leads to an
increase in pathological or problem gambling.187
5. Too Cumbersome
Opponents of problem gambling courts also argue that it is too cumber-
some and difficult for courts to identify eligible individuals.  This, they argue,
is because pathological gambling is harder to identify than substance abuse, and
it is more difficult for the court to find a causal connection between pathologi-
cal gambling and crime than substance abuse and crime.188  However, while
urinalysis may not identify pathological gambling, it also does not detect
mental illness, and yet mental health courts have found ways to identify appro-
priate treatment.  Like mental health courts, problem gambling courts rely on
clinical evaluations to identify problem gambling and to assess whether the
problem gambling is associated with the illegal behavior and if so, whether the
individual is likely to benefit from treatment.
E. Proposed Solutions
While there are criticisms and concerns surrounding problem-solving
courts, there are also suggestions for how to resolve them.  In January of 2002,
the American Council of Chief Defenders (ACCD), a section of the National
180 Hinshaw, supra note 97, at 341.
181 Id.
182 NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY EXEC-
UTIVE SUMMARY, 8 (1999), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/execsmry.pdf.
183 NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY FINAL
REPORT, 1-1 (1999), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/fullrpt.html.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 4-1 (citing NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING: A CRITICAL
REVIEW Exec-2 (1999)).
188 Hinshaw, supra note 97, at 341.
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Legal Aid & Defender Association, compiled “Ten Tenets of Fair and Effective
Problem Solving Courts,” which set forth guidelines for improving problem-
solving courts.189  The ACCD proposed that public defenders be included “in
the design, implementation and operation of the court, including the determina-
tion of participant eligibility and selection of service providers.”190  In addition,
the ACCD proposed that public defenders also participate in the monitoring
and evaluation of the problem-solving courts and in the development of poli-
cies and procedures.191  This would allow public defenders to address privacy
concerns and ensure confidentiality.192
According to the ACCD, problem-solving courts should also offer the
prosecution and the defense equal access and distribution of resources, includ-
ing resources to hire and train staff to work in the problem-solving court.193
Further, problem-solving court policies should not interfere with defense coun-
sel’s ethical duty to zealously advocate for his client, including conducting dis-
covery, challenging evidence or recommending alternative treatments or
sanctions.194
The ACCD guidelines also stress the importance that the defendant’s par-
ticipation be voluntary.195  This includes the defendant’s right to review the
problem-solving court program requirements and possible outcomes with his
counsel and ensuring that counsel has adequate time to investigate the case
against the defendant in order to best counsel him about his decision to enter
the program.196  The courts should also implement a policy to protect the
defendant’s right against self-incrimination.197  In addition, according to the
ACCD, problem-solving courts should not require a guilty plea in order to enter
treatment nor should defendants be locked into the treatment program once
they have accepted it.198  Defendants should be able to voluntarily withdraw
from treatment at any time “without prejudice to [their] . . . trial rights.”199
Further, treatment and other program requirements should be “the least restric-
tive possible to achieve agreed-upon goals.”200  Once the defendant has suc-
cessfully completed the program, the charges should be dismissed and the
defendant’s record should be expunged.201
In addition to the ACCD guidelines, others suggest increasing the trans-
parency of decision-making in problem-solving courts by requiring judges to
provide rationale for their decisions202 and by making appellate review of prob-
189 Jim Neuhard & Scott Wallace, Ten Tenets of Fair and Effective Problem Solving Courts,
NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N (Jan. 1, 2002), available at http://www.nlada.org/
DMS/Documents/1019501190.93/document_info.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Casey, supra note 144, at 1518 (citation omitted).
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lem-solving court decisions available.203  This would allow the appeals court to
examine whether a problem-solving court complied with due process consider-
ations as well as monitor that the problem-solving court is doing its job; that is,
that the court is providing treatment to the eligible and is monitoring treatment
providers to ensure that they are providing the promised services.204
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the criticisms, problem-solving courts appear to be dealing with
their challenges while experiencing success.  “[T]he trend toward problem-
solving courts is increasing[.]”205  There are now problem-solving courts for
mental health, substance abuse, domestic violence, drunk driving, parole or
probation violations and problem gambling, among others.206
The Comprehensive Problem Gambling Act of 2009 proposes that prob-
lem and pathological gambling should be included along with substance abuse
disorders and mental health disorders under the Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration.  Given the similarities and the relationship
between problem gambling, substance abuse and mental health disorders and
the consequences that these conditions can have, problem gambling should be
viewed and treated as mental health and substance abuse are.
Passage of the Comprehensive Problem Gambling Act of 2009 would
influence society’s perception of problem gambling, continuing the shift
towards viewing problem gambling as an illness requiring treatment rather than
a weakness requiring punishment.  Further, including problem gambling with
substance abuse disorders and mental health disorders under SAMHSA would
give problem gambling the same priority in funding, which would allow for
further research on preventing, treating and raising awareness of problem gam-
bling.  In addition, more research could be done on the effectiveness of the
already existing problem gambling courts and, given positive results, future
problem gambling courts could be created.  Crimes committed because of prob-
lem gambling should be treated the same as crimes committed due to a sub-
stance abuse or mental health illness for the benefit of society, the gambler and
the gambler’s family.
203 Id. See also Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 875, 956 (2003).
204 Dorf, supra note 203, at 956, 959.
205 Developments in the Law, supra note 72, at 1179 (citation omitted).
206 Odegaard, supra note 36, at 228 (citations omitted).
